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IN THE SUPREME COU&T
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MARK A. WOOD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
HARRY M. WEENIG and ERMA P.
WEENIG, his wife,

Case No. 19978

Defendants and Appellants.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a fraudulent conveyance action to set aside the conveyance
by defendant Harry M. Weenig of his interest in his residence to his
wife, defendant Erma P. Weenig, so that sucth residence may be levied
upon in partial satisfaction
Weening

with

interest

of a $200,000 judgment against Harry M.

thereon

at

the

rate

of

8% per

annum

from

February 1, 1974.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

On February 6,

1980, plaintiff

was granted a default

judgment

against defendant Erma P. Weenig which provided that the conveyance
of Harry M. Weenig1 s interest in the residence of the defendants

to

Erma P. Weenig constituted a fraudulent conveyance as to plaintiff and
that plaintiff could levy upon such interest in partial satisfaction of his
- 2 -

$200,000 judgment.

On May 2, 1984, defendant Erma P. Weenig moved

the lower court to set aside such default judgment under Rule 60(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and such motion was denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant's seek to have the order denying their motion for relief
from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utab Rules of Civil Procedure
reversed and the default judgment set aside.

STATEMENT OF FAClfS

On
defendant,

February 1,

1974,

Harry M. Weenig

plaintiff
(Harry),

obtained

a

judgment

in the Marion Circuit

against
Court,

State of Indiana, for the sum of $200,000.00, plus interest thereon at 8
percent per annum and costs incurred therein.
150)

(R. at 77, 112 and

On June 21, 1976, that judgment was affirmed by the Court of

Appeals for the State of Indiana, Second District.

(R. at 77 and 112)

On ^February 14, 1977, the Indiana judgment was reduced to a judgment
in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah in the
amount of $200,000.00 plus interest thereon at 8 percent per annum.
(R. at 77, 81-82, 112 and 150)

On February 16, 1977, said judgment

was docketed in the Clerk 1 s Office of the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

- 3 -

(Id.)

On

August 10,

1976,

plaintiff,

in

conducting

supplemental

proceedings to determine the availability of assets of Harry M. Weenig
for satisfaction of such judgment, took the deposition of said defendant.
(R.

at

defendant

77-78,

112

and

149)

Harry M. Weenig,

One

day

transferred

prior

to

all r i g h t ,

such

deposition,

title and interest

which he had in the real property where he resides located at 4464
Covecrest Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah to his wife, defendant Erma P.
Weenig (Erma).

(R. at 77-78, 83, 112 and 149-50)

On July 30, 1979,

plaintiff initiated an action in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County against Harry M. Weenig and his wife Erma P .
Weenig, seeking to set aside such transfer as a fraudulent conveyance.
(R. at 2-4, 113, 150, 151 and 154)

In addition, on July 30, 1979, the

deposition of defendant, Erma P. Weenig, was noticed by plaintiff and a
copy of such notice was mailed to defendant Erma P. Weenig at 4464
Covecrest Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah

84117.

(R. at 8, 113 and 155)

On August 9, 1979, process in the fraudulent conveyance action
was

served

upon

Erma P.

Weenig

by

Frank E.

Spriggs,

Deputy

Constable for John A. Sindt, Constable Murray Precinct, by leaving a
copy of the Summons and Complaint with Mrs. Weenig1 s daughter,
Mrs. Weenig's

usual

place

of

abode.

(R.

at

113

and

at

159-67)

Mrs. Weenig's daughter was a person of suitable age and discretion
there residing over the age of fourteen.

(Id.)

Mrs. Weenig's daughter

refused to open the door of Erma's home at the time service was made.
Instead,

she

communicated

with

the

constable

through

an

intercom

communication system having a speaker on the front porch of Weenig's
- 4 -

home.

Id.

Because

the

constable

was unsuccessful

in getting

the

daughter to open the door and accept servipe for Erma P. Weenig, he
told the daughter he was serving Erma P. Weenig by leaving the papers
with the daughter.
on

the

porch

He then put the complaint and summons face down

of Weenig's

home.

Because

she

would

not

identify

herself, the daughter was referred to as Jane Doe, daughter, in the
return made by the Constable's office.

(R. at 112-13 and 159-67.)

The testimony of Frank E. Spriggs, deputy constable, concerning
service of process was as follows:
Q
Could you tell us the facts and circumstances
surrounding the service of that complaint and summons?
A
Well, as near as I can remember, it was on an
afternoon in August, and I went to the home on Covecrest
Drive. I knocked on the door. I don't remember whether I
knocked on the door or rang the bell, but anyway a young
woman answered through an intercom system.
I identified
myself as a deputy constable and asked if one of the parents
were home, and they indicated they weren't. I asked who
she was, and she indicated that she was the daughter of the
defendants. I asked if she was over the age of 14, and she
answered that she was. I asked her name, and she refused
to answer. I asked her to come to the door. She refused.
After about 10 minutes of this kind of going on, I got upset
and told the person that I was going to fill a summons and
complaint out and leave it on the porch, and they said that
they did not have to accept it and I just said, you are
served.
And I left.
Q
Was there any communication by the woman or girl
at the door concerning instructions that she had received
from her father at all in regard to legal papers?
A
Yes. She said her Dad said that she didn't have
to answer the door. (R. at 33)

The

constable's

wife

testified

that

she

overheard

the

following

conversation at the time of service:
. . . I heard her say that she would not open the door,
and that she had been instructed not to accept any papers
concerning her father's business. (R. at 171)
On August 28,
conveyance

action

1979, an Amended Complaint
was

filed

naming

two

In such

additional

fraudulent
defendants.

Inasmuch as Erma P. Weenig had not filed an answer to the original
Complaint,

the

Amended

Complaint

was

not

served

upon

her

in

accordance

with Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

as

follows (R. at 155-56):
No service need be made on parties in default
appear except that pleadings asserting new
claims for relief against them shall be served
the manner provided for service of Summons in

for failure to
or additional
upon them in
Rule 4.

On February 6, 1980, p u r s u a n t to minute entry of the Honorable
Homer F.
Weenig's
judgment.

Wilkinson,
default
(R.

was
at

Third District
entered
115

and

and
156)

Court J u d g e ,

defendant

plaintiff

granted

Such

was

judgment

stated

Erma P.
a

default

that

the

conveyance of real property located at 4464 Covecrest Drive, Salt Lake
City, Utah, by Harry M. Weenig to Erma P. Weenig was fraudulent as
to Mr. Weenig's creditors as follows:
. . . It is ordered,
adjudged
and decreed that
the
conveyance from Harry M. Weenig to Erma P. Weenig of real
property located at 4464 Covecrest Drive, Salt Lake City, Salt
Lake County, Utah, reflected by Quitclaim Deed dated
August 9, 1976 is hereby disregarded and Plaintiff is hereby
granted a Writ of Execution upon the property so conveyed.
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Defendants
(Weenigs),
judgment

and

filed
set

respondants,

a motion

aside

in

under

Harry M.

the

lower

Rule 60(b)

and

court
of

the

Erma P.

to have
Utah

Weenig

the

Rules

default
of

Civil

Procedure on the basis that service of process upon her was improper
Such motion

came on for an evidentuary

District Court on May 2,
J. Dennis

Frederick,

evidentuary

hearing,

hearing before

1984, at 10:00 a[m.,

without
Judge

a

jury.

Frederick

At

the

refjused

the

Third

before the Honorable
conclusion
to

set

the

of

that

default

judgment aside. His ruling was based on the fact that Erma had failed
(a) to set forth
action;

(b)

a meritorious

defense to the fraudulent

conveyance

to timely file her motion for relief from judgment under

Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and (c) that service
of the summons and complaint on Erma was ih compliance with Rule 4 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. at 1^6-117; 175-76).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS
IT WAS BASED ON THE TRIAL COURTTS EVALUTAION OF THE
* CREDITABILITY OF THE WITNESSES AND THEIR EVIDENCE
At the hearing in the lower court on May 2, 1984, plaintiff and
defendant

presented

evidence in support of and in opposition to the

motion of Erma to set aside the default judgment.

At the conclusion of

such evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick

determined that plaintiff's

witnesses were more believeable

than defendants and found in plaintiff 1 s favor on that basis as follows:
- 7 -

The court: very well.
With regard to this matter,
counsel, as is generally the case, the issues here would have
to do with the credibUty of the witnesses because there is
conflicting testimony. The court has not been impressed with
the candor or testimony of Mrs. Weenig. It has not been
convincing.
As far as I am concerned, the evidence has
established that the elements comprising the tests set forth in
the Musselman case, the 1983 case, have not been met.
Accordingly, the motion to set aside the default judgment is
denied. (R. at 175-76) (Emphasis added)
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that if the findings
of

the

trial

court are supported by evidence which is

substantial,

competent and admissable, its judgment will not be substituted for that
of the trial court.

Dang v.

Cox C o r p . , 655 P.2d 658 (Utah 1982);

Jensen v . Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981); Meese v . Brigham Young
University, 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981); Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290
(Utah 1975); Peopled Finance and Thrift Company of Ogden v . Doman,
27 Utah

2d 404, 497 P.2d

17 (Utah

1972); Staples Excavation

and

Erection Co. v . Weyher Construction C o . , 26 Utah 2d 387, 490 P.2d 330
(Utah 1971); and De Vas v . Noble, 13 Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d 290 (Utah
1962).

This is because the trial court, having heard and viewed the

witnesses and their testimony,
evaluate the same.

is in a better position to weigh and

The rule is best stated in Staples Excavation at 333

as follows:
It would appear that this court is asked to review issues
of fact rather than issues of law. A review of the pertinent
parts of the record before us leads us to the conclusion that
the trial court could fairly and reasonably remain unconvinced
that the appellants here had established their claim of
damages by a preponderance of the evidence.
Being an
action at law, we are not at liberty to interfere with the
findings of the court below unless such findings are arbitrary
or have no basis in the record. In the case before us the
- 8 -

record reveals numerous and wide conflicts in the evidence
which only the trial judge was in a position to evaluate. As
to the appellants 1 claim that the court failed to give proper
credance to the testimony of their witnesses which was
uncontradicted, this too was a matter for the trial court to
weigh.
A review of the record fails to establish a reasonable
basis to reverse the decision of the court below.
The
decision of the trial court having been made upon disputed
and contradictory evidence, it would appear that the rule we
have enunciated in numerous cases, that the trial court being
in an advantaged position from having heard the testimony of
the witnesses and observed their demeanor is better able to
determine issues of fact than is this court upon a written
record. We therefore conclude that the decision and judgment
of the court below must be affirmed.
The rule is further supported by the case of Tonelson v. Haines,
2 Ariz. App. 127 406 P.2d 845 (1965) cited by appellants in their brief.
In that case,

the appellate court left to the trial court the task of

evaluating the credibility of the witnesses and their evidence.
doing,

the court affirmed

the lower court's

In so

decision that service of

process was improper.
In
District

the

present

Court

defendant's

case the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick,

Judge,

witnesses

decided
were

in

plain tiff's

unbelievable.

favor

because

His findings

conclusions of law were entered in accordance therewith.

of

fact

Third
the
and

As stated

numerous times by this court, the trial court is in a better position to
evaluate the creditability of the witnesses and the p a r t y ' s evidence and
will not be reversed on appeal if there is evidence in support of such
findings and the trial court has not abused iis discretion.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS DEFENDANT
FAILED TO SATISFY THE REQUIRMENTS FOR SETTING
ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b) OF
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
In their docketing statement at 5, Weenigs state

that the trial

court errored in refusing to set aside the default judgment against Erma
on the basis that (a) she was not served in this action in accordance
with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and (b) she has a
meritorious

defense

to the

fraudulent

should have been permitted to raise.
that

the

lower

court

specifically

conveyance

action

which

she

The problem with those issues is
found

that

Erma was

served

in

accordance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the
record on appeal is utterly void of any meritorious defense which she
may have to the fraudulent conveyance action.
meritorious

defense

in

the

lower

court.

The

She did not raise a
first

time

that

a

meritorious defense was raised by Erma was in the docketing statement,
filed with the Utah Supreme Court,

at 2 where she states that the

conveyance which plaintiff alleges was fraudulent as to himself was made
by

Harry M.

Weenig

to

Erma P.

Weenig

for

good

and

valuable

consideration.
In order for Weenigs to have the default judgment set aside, they
must satisfy three requirements as set forth in the recent Utah Supreme
Court case of State of Utah v . Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah
1983) as follows:

- 10 -

In order for the defendant to be relieved from the
default judgment, he must not only show that the judgment
was entered against him through excusable neglect [or any
other reason specified in Rule 6 0 ( b ) ] , but he must also show
that his motion to set aside the judgment was timely, and that
he has a meritorious defense to the actibn.
Weenig's have failed to satisfy those three requirements as is shown by
the record below.

a.

Defendants motion to set aside judgment was untimely.
Erma made her motion to set aside the default judgment under Rule

60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a
party may be relieved from a final judgment as follows:
On motion upon such terms as are just, the court may in
furtherance
of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons . . . (4) when, for any cause, the
Summons in an action has not been personally served upon
the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant
has failed to appear in said action . . . . The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time and for reasons ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) , (3)
or ( 4 ) , not more than three months after the judgment, order
or proceeding was entered or taken. (emphasis added)
Rule 60(b) is clear that a motion for relief from a judgment based
upon

improper

service

months of the judgment.

of

the

Summons must be made within

three

In this action, the judgment was entered on

February 6, 1980, and docketed on February 8, 1980.

Erma's motion

was made more than four years after the entrance and docketing of said
judgment. Said motion was clearly outside the time requirement set forth
in Rule 60(b).

- 11 -

In

the

lower

court,

Erma

relied

upon

the

case

of Woody v .

Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 249, 461 P.2d 465 (1969) for the proposition that
the

three

month

provision

of

Rule

service of process is defective.

60(b) has no application

where

Defendants and respondants have also

cited such case as controlling in their docketing statement filed in this
court.
for

That case is inapplicable to the case presently before the court

several reasons.

First,

the summons and complaint in this case

were properly served upon defendant Erma P. Weenig at her usual place
of abode by leaving the same with her daughter who was a person of
suitable age and discretion there residing.

Second, in the Woody case

an ambiquity arose as to which defendant process was being served
upon.

In

defendants

Woody,
but

the

process
return

was

left

with

the

wife

of

one

of

indicated that it had been served

the
upon

another of the defendants who did not reside at the home where service
was made.

Because of the ambiquity, the Utah Supreme Court held

that service was defective and the three month period was inapplicable.
In the present case, there is no such ambiquity.

It is clear from both

the summons and the r e t u r n , the testimony below and the lower court's
findings that service was being made upon Erma P. Weenig and that she
was the person who needed to respond to the complaint in order to
avoid a default judgment being entered against h e r .
Third,

not only was defendant Erma P. Weenig properly

served

with the summons and complaint in this action, but she received notice
of such case p u r s u a n t to a notice of deposition which was mailed to her
personally and a notice of lis pendens which was recorded with the Salt
- 12 -

Lake County Recorder on the real property in which she resided.
therefore

It is

clear that the Woody case is distinquishable, that the time

period

of

Rule 60(b)

should

be

summarily

is

inapplicable

affirmed

in

and the lower court's

accordance

decision

with the lower

court's

finding that Erma's motion was untimely.

b.

The lower court's judgment should be affirmed as defendant Erma
P. Weenig failed to present a meritorious defense.
As set forth in the Musselman case, a default judgment will not be

set aside under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless
the defendant sets forth a meritorious defense to the complaint in said
action.

The

record

on

appeal is

void

of

any

evidence,

or

even

arguments or statements of counsel, as to a meritorious defense which
Erma P. Weenig may have to the fraudulent conveyance action.

The

first time that Erma raised a meritorious defense is in the docketing
statement at 2 where she states that the conveyance of the home by
Harry M.

to

consideration.
matters,

Erma P.

for

Transportation

was

made

for

good

and

valuable

The law is clear and this court has repeatedly held that

including

considered

Weenig

evidence,

the
v.

first

Fuller,

M

not offered

time

on

at the hearing cannot

appeal."

Utah

Department

be
of

603 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1979); Edgar v .

Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Reliable Furniture Co. v . Fidelity
and Guarantee Insurance Underwriters, I n c . , 14 Utah 2d 169 380 P.2d
135 (Utah 1963); and Pilcher v . State, Dept. of Social Services, 663
P.2d 450 (Utah 1983).
- 13 -

Counsel for Wood has reviewed the transcript of the lower court
proceeding as well as the record in an attempt to discover any evidence
or mention of a meritorious defense which Erma may have presented to
the lower court.

The only mention of a meritorious defense is contained

in Finding of Fact number 15 (R. at 116) and Conclusion of Law number
4 (R. at 117).

Both the finding of fact and conclusion of law of the

lower court state in effect
present

that defendant

Erma P. Weenig failed to

any evidence that would suggest or establish

defense to the fraudulent conveyance action.

a meritorious

Inasmuch as Erma failed

to present a meritorious defense to the fraudulent conveyance action in
the lower court,

she is precluded from doing so for the first time on

appeal.

c.

The lower court judgment should be affirmed as service of process
on defendant Erma P. Weenig was in accordance with Rule 4 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Weenigs state in their docketing statement and Ln Appellant's Brief

that the summons and complaint in the fraudulent conveyance action was
not personally served upon defendant as required by Rule 4(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

For that reason they argue they should

be granted relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) of such rules.
Such argument is directly contrary to the conclusion of law of the lower
court (R. at 116 1F 1) which states as follows:
The summons and complaint in the above-entitled fraudulent
conveyance action were properly served in accordance with
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure upon defendant
- 14 -

Erma P. Weenig by Frank E. Spriggs, Deputy Constable for
John A. Sindt, Constable, Murray Precinct, by leaving a
copy thereof at Mrs. Weenig1 s usual place of abode with her
daughter over the age of fourteen, who qualified as a person
of suitable age and discretion there residing.
It is also contrary to the decision of courts from other jurisdictions
which have held on similar facts that service of process was proper in
accordance with rules for service similar to those contained in Rule 4 of
the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.

business

and

Professional

Adjustment Co. v. Baker, 62 Or. App. 237, 659 P.2d 1025 (Or. App.
1983) and United Pacific Insurance Co. v . Discount C o . , 15 Wash. App.
559, 550 P.2d 699 (1976).
In the Baker case,

the constable knocked on the door of

the

defendant's residence in order to serve the summons and complaint upon
him.

The defendant

away.

yelled in a loud voice for the constable to go

The constable recognized the defendant by his voice because he

had communicated with him on a prior occasion for forty-five minutes.
The constable responded in a loud voice that he was serving the papers
and that the defendant had been served.
papers on the front

porch.

The constable then left the

The Oregon appellate court

specifically

held* that service upon the defendant was proper and that a defendant
could not avoid service by refusing to identify himself or accept the
papers as follows:
The rules do not require an actual in-hand delivery, or a
face-to-face encounter with an acknowledgement of identity
from the person to be served, as defendant argues they do.
To so require would allow a defendant to defeat service
simply by refusing to identify himself or accept the p a p e r s .
It would make personal service a degrading game of wiles and
- 15 -

t r i c k s , rather than a procedure for insuring that a defendant
received actual notice of the subject and pendancy of an
action.
Baker at 1027.
In the United Pacific case, the defendant opened the front door of
her

residence

in

the

process

servers presence.

When the

process

server told her who he was and that he had some legal papers for h e r ,
she slammed the door knocking the papers from his hand.

The process

server then stated in a loud voice that she had been served and left.
The

papers

never

actually

touched

the

defendant's

hand but

were

knocked from the constable's possession by the action of the defendant
in slamming the door.

The Washington Appellant Court held at 700-01

that service of process was valid as follows:
RCW 4.28.080 provides in p a r t :
The summons
thereof as follows:

shall be

served

by

delivering

a

copy

(9) If the suit be against a company or corporation
other than those designated in the proceeding subdivisions of
this section, to the president or other head of the company
or corporation, secretary, cashier, or managing agent thereof
or to the secretary, stenographer or office assistant of the
president or other head of the company or corporation,
secretary, cashier or managing agent.

(14) In all other cases to the defendant personally, or
by leaving a copy of the summons at the house of his usual
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
resident therein.
Service made in the modes provided in this section shall
be taken and be held to be personal service.
- 16 -

# * # #

The facts in the case at bench demonstrate a clear
attempt by the process server to yield possession and control
of the documents to Mrs. Norelius while he was positioned in
a manner to accomplish that act. Normal "delivery" thereof
would have been affected upon Mrs. Norelius except for her
obvious attempt to evade service by slamming the door after
the papers had been held out to h e r . The summons need not
actually be placed in the defendant's hand. We find, as did
the trial court, that facts in the recor4 supported conclusion
that "delivery" occurred and service wa^ effected.
Appellants argue in their brief at 12-14J that the reasoning of the
Arizona Appellate Court in Tonelson V. Haines, 2 Ariz. App. 127, 406
P.2d 845 (1965) should be adopted by thi$ court to the effect

that

service is not valid unless the person being served knows papers are
being left with him.

The problem with appellant's argument is that the

Tonelson decision is based on a specific finding of the lower court that
the person there being served was unaware that service was being
attempted and she did not do anything to defeat service.

The lower

court in this case made opposite findings and conclusions.
Contrary

to

appellant's

arguments,

the

holding in Tonelson is

simply that the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for the
trial^ court as to the credibility of the witnesses and their evidence.
This is clear from
After
follows:

the language of the court at 846-847 as follows:

hearing

the evidence,

the trial court found

"There is no dispute in the evidence in
relation to the fact that the defendant was at his
home at the time in question; as to the fact that
Mr. Estein called at the defendant's home at the
time in question; as to the fact that Mrs. Haines
was then a member of the family of the defendant
and that the same Mrs. Haines answered the door;
- 17 -

as

and that the copy of the complaint and summons
were not physically placed in the possession of
Mrs. Haines at the time in question.
The court
need not decide the law point as to whether or not
the leaving of a copy of the complaint and summons
on the premises and in the vicinity of an individual
following that in dividual 1 s refusal to accept the same
constitutes good service."
"The purpose of the visit of Mr. Estein was
not presented to Mrs. Haines in such manner that
she heard and understood the fact that Mr. Estein
was there for the purpose of serving process upon
the defendant.
This being so, the fact of leaving
the same between the screen door and the front
door does not constitute service.
There was no
intentional act on the part of Mrs. Haines designed
to knowingly attempt to defeat the service of
process."
On appeal, the contention is made that the undisputed
facts constitute service as a matter of law and that the trial
court neither had discretion, nor abused its discretion, in
setting aside the default and default judgment.
In Eldridge v . Jagger, 83 Ariz. 150, 317 P.2d 942
(1957), our Supreme Court said:
"It is a well-established rule of law that the
r e t u r n of service of process can be impeached only
by clear and convincing evidence." 83 Ariz. 150,
152, 317 P.2d 942, 943.
In this same case, however, the court also said:
"However, the trial judge, in hearing the testimony
and in observing the demeanor and manner of the
witnesses in testifying as to conflicting facts,
concluded that the defendant Jagger had not been
served with summons and should be given an
opportunity
to litigate a disputed
obligation.
Wehave repeatedly held an application to open,
vacate or set aside a judgment is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and its action will not
be distrubed by this court except for a clear abuse
of discretion." 83 Ariz. 150, 152, 317 P.2d 942,
944.
We hold that in order for there to be a" * * * leaving
* * * with * * *" a person a copy of the summons and
complaint, as required by Rule 4 ( d ) , supra, such person
must be aware of the "leaving." We have not been cited a
decision directly in point. Generally, when personal service
is attempted, the person served must be apprised in some
- 18 -

that the person "with" whom the papers are left must have
knowledge that the papers are so left.
Otherwise service
might be accomplished by surreptitously placeing papers in a
person 1 s pocket, or by other means not likely to bring about
actual notice.
In this case the evidence is "clear" that Mrs. Haines did
not have any knowledge of the leaving of this summons with
h e r . Whether it is "convincing" we feel should be left up to
the trial court under the Jagger decision. It was the trial
court 1 s function, and not o u r s , to judge the credibility of the
witnesses and we hold that we are bound by its decision in
this regard. (emphasis added)
In

the

present

case,

the

lower

court

specifically

found

that

defendant's daughter resided at the usual place of abode of Erma P.
Weenig,

that she was over the age of fourteen and that she was a

person of suitable age and discretion.

Th& court further found that

service was made at such usual place of abode and that service was
properly made upon Erma by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to her daughter by leaving the same on the front porch after
the

daughter

process.

refused

to open

the front

door to accept service of

If the trial court or this court were to hold that such facts

do not constitute proper service, a defendant could avoid service of
process and jurisdiction of the court over him by simply refusing to
take possession of the summons and complaint.
moc£ery of the judicial system.

Such would result in a

The lower court judgment should be

summarily affirmed as there is no question that service of process was
valid in this case.

Defendants

cannot avoid service by refusing

to

accept process and instructing residents of their household to do the
same.

- 19 -

CONCLUSION

For

the

foregoing

reasons

Wood respectfully

requests

that

the

judgment of the lower court be summarily affirmed.
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